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Portrait of Aristotle

Aristotelianism · Treatise

Nicomachean Ethics

by Aristotle · The Architect of Causes · Classical Greece, 384-322 BC

An investigation of virtue, friendship, judgment, and human flourishing.

  • Advanced
  • c. 340 BCE
  • ~6 hr 15 min read
  • 38 chapter guides
  • Public domain

Start reading · Read the Translator's Preface guide free

Before the text

Editor's Prelude

A Life Made by Its Actions

Aristotle spent nearly twenty years in Plato's Academy before eventually establishing his own school, the Lyceum, in Athens. In the fourth century BCE, philosophy could concern the ordering of a city as directly as the ordering of a person's life. The Nicomachean Ethics brings those questions together. Aristotle asks what human beings are trying to achieve through their work, choices and relationships, and what would make a whole life go well.

He speaks as a teacher to people who already have some experience of action and some formation of character. His examples are recognisable: learning a craft, facing danger, giving money, losing an argument, making a friend. Their setting is also historically particular. Citizens, households and enslaved people occupy unequal places in the world he assumes. His accounts of dignity and responsibility sometimes carry those inequalities with them.

The happiness at stake is more than a passing feeling of satisfaction. Aristotle is asking about living and acting well over time, with other people and amid circumstances no one entirely controls. A virtue must become dependable in practice, yet good practice requires judgment about a situation that may never recur in exactly the same form. His prose follows that difficulty: common beliefs are tested, distinctions are revised and a plausible answer may prove inadequate. Knowing what deserves to be done and becoming someone who can do it remain closely connected questions.

The opening pages

Book I: Ends and the Highest Good

Chapter 1

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

Chapter 2

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art.

And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states.

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Chapter guides · 38

  1. Translator's Preface

    Words That Do More Than One Job

    Ross explains why Aristotle's Greek cannot always keep the same English equivalent.

    The text behind the translation

    Ross bases his translation on Bywater's Greek text, recording departures where he adopts a different reading. His preface identifies a particular textual judgment behind the English, rather than presenting the translation as a transparent copy.

    A vocabulary still taking shape

    Some words are passing from ordinary speech into philosophical use. Ross therefore allows their English equivalents to vary with the argument. A familiar word may carry a more exact meaning here, while a technical term may still retain something of everyday life.

  2. Book I: Ends and the Highest Good

    The Chain of Human Aims

    Medicine seeks health and strategy seeks victory. Aristotle asks what gives all these pursuits their direction.

    An end beyond another end

    Aristotle begins with ordinary aiming: arts, choices, and public life all reach toward some good. Some activities serve further purposes; he asks whether there is a highest good that gives the rest their direction. Politics has authority over the others because it orders education and action within the city.

    The limits of precision

    People agree to call the highest good happiness but disagree over its substance. Pleasure, honour and wealth each leave difficulties. Since human action varies, the inquiry cannot promise the certainty of mathematics. Its intended hearer needs experience and good habits: knowledge alone will not help someone whose desires govern every choice.

  3. Book I: The Human Function

    The Function Argument

    Aristotle looks for the human good in excellent rational activity, after questioning a single universal Good.

  4. Book I: Fortune, Praise, and the Soul

    Happiness Across a Whole Life

    Excellent activity gives a life stability, but serious misfortune still matters.

  5. Book II: Habit and Character

    Virtue Begins in Practice

    Repeated action forms character, but repetition can form bad habits as readily as good ones.

  6. Book II: Defining Moral Virtue

    Virtue Chooses the Mean

    The right response depends on the person and circumstances, not an arithmetic midpoint.

  7. Book II: The Virtue Table and the Hard Mean

    The Mean Is Hard to Hit

    Examples give the mean substance, while particular cases still require judgment.

  8. Book III: Voluntary Action and Choice

    When an Action Belongs to Us

    Force, ignorance and deliberation help distinguish actions for which an agent can be held responsible.

  9. Book III: Wish and Responsibility

    How Character Becomes Our Responsibility

    Aristotle traces settled dispositions back to actions, while admitting that a formed character is hard to change.

  10. Book III: Courage

    Courage Faces the Right Fear

    The brave person endures danger for the sake of what is noble, even when endurance is painful.

  11. Book III: Temperance

    Temperance Trains Desire

    Temperance concerns bodily appetites whose pleasures can come into conflict with reason.

  12. Book IV: Liberality and Money

    Giving and Taking Well

    Liberality concerns the use of money, especially giving for the right purpose.

  13. Book IV: Magnificence and Greatness of Soul

    Great Expenditure and Great Claims

    Magnificence concerns spending on a large scale; greatness of soul concerns deserving and claiming great honour.

  14. Book IV: Honor, Anger, and Friendliness

    Anger and Social Balance

    Honour, anger and pleasant company each require a response that fits the situation.

  15. Book IV: Truth, Wit, and Shame

    Truth, Wit and Shame

    Conversation has its virtues; shame is a different kind of response.

  16. Book V: Justice as Lawfulness and Fairness

    Justice as Whole Virtue Toward Others

    Lawfulness and fairness name related but distinct senses of justice.

  17. Book V: Distribution, Correction, and Exchange

    Justice Measures Unequal Things

    Distribution, correction and exchange require different forms of equality.

  18. Book V: Political Justice and Voluntary Action

    Justice Within a Political Order

    Citizenship, changing laws and voluntary action complicate the account of a just act.

  19. Book V: Equity and Self-Injustice

    Equity and the Limits of a General Law

    A just judgment may need to correct a rule that cannot anticipate every case.

  20. Book VI: Kinds of Knowledge

    Many Ways to Know

    Truth about necessary things differs from the judgment needed for making and acting.

  21. Book VI: Practical Wisdom and Understanding

    Judgment That Reaches the Particular

    Political wisdom, good deliberation and understanding depend on experience as well as general knowledge.

  22. Book VI: Wisdom and Virtue Together

    Virtue and Wisdom Need Each Other

    A correct end and sound practical judgment must work together.

  23. Book VII: Incontinence and Knowledge

    The Puzzle of Weakness

    How can a person act against what he knows to be better?

  24. Book VII: Appetite, Anger, and Endurance

    Different Failures of Self-Rule

    Appetite, anger, pain and unusual desires do not all produce the same kind of failure.

  25. Book VII: Continence and Weakness

    Self-Control and the Character Behind It

    Holding to a decision is valuable only when the decision deserves to be held.

  26. Book VII: Pleasure and the Good

    Pleasure and the Good

    Arguments against pleasure must distinguish its kinds and its relation to activity.

  27. Book VIII: Kinds of Friendship

    Why Friendship Belongs in Ethics

    People need friends in prosperity as well as adversity, and they love them for different reasons.

  28. Book VIII: Unequal Friendships and Community

    Equality Within Unequal Friendships

    Friendship can join people of unequal standing, but its claims must reflect the relationship.

  29. Book VIII: Political and Family Friendship

    Friendship in Households and Cities

    Forms of authority change what affection and justice can mean between people.

  30. Book VIII: Friendship, Claims, and Complaint

    Friendship, Claims and Complaint

    Disputes arise when friends value the same exchange by different standards.

  31. Book IX: Claims and Broken Friendships

    When Friendships Strain or Break

    What friends owe depends on the terms, history and purpose of the relationship.

  32. Book IX: Self-Love and Concord

    A Friend as Another Self

    Friendship, goodwill and civic concord depend on different ways of wishing and acting well.

  33. Book IX: Benefactors, Friends, and Shared Life

    Why a Happy Person Still Needs Friends

    Benefaction, noble self-love and shared activity connect friendship to a flourishing life.

  34. Book IX: The Need for Companionship

    How Many Friends Can a Life Hold?

    Intimate friendship needs time, while prosperity and misfortune give friends different occasions to be present.

  35. Book X: Pleasure Reconsidered

    Pleasure Gets a Final Hearing

    Aristotle weighs arguments about pleasure against both their reasoning and the facts of life.

  36. Book X: Pleasure, Activity, and Happiness

    Pleasure Completes Activity

    Pleasure strengthens the activity to which it belongs; happiness cannot consist simply in amusement.

  37. Book X: Contemplation and the Best Life

    The Highest Human Activity

    Aristotle gives contemplation the highest place while preserving the needs and responsibilities of human life.

  38. Book X: Education, Law, and Politics

    Education, Law and Political Judgment

    Knowing about virtue is insufficient unless character and conduct can be formed.

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Questions readers ask

How long does it take to read Nicomachean Ethics?
About 6 hr 15 min in total.
How difficult is Nicomachean Ethics?
Advanced. A long treatise; about 6 hours of reading.
Can I read Nicomachean Ethics for free?
Nicomachean Ethics is part of Nexus Premium, so reading it needs an account and a Premium subscription. The opening above and two chapter guides on this page are free to read.
How many chapter guides are there?
38 chapter guides, written by the Nexus editors. Two open in full here; the rest show their opening line.

About Aristotle

Aristotle studied at Plato's Academy, tutored the young Alexander the Great, and founded his own school in Athens. His work ranged across logic, ethics, politics, biology, rhetoric, and metaphysics, creating systems that shaped scholarship for centuries.

“What is this thing for?”

Aristotle becomes the operating system for logic, ethics, biology, politics, and medieval scholastic thought.

Source text: public domain. Chapter guides: original Nexus writing. Nicomachean Ethics is part of The Nexus Archive, guided Quests through the great works.

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